WHEN WAS JESUS CRUCIFIED?

 I just finished listening to an excellent series of lectures from the Great Courses on the New Testament. The professor is Bart D. Ehrman, who thinks that the writers of the Gospels (whom we shall call the Evangelists) botched the story of Jesus because they got inaccurate information about what Jesus said and did, and then they changed the details of the flawed information that they got in order to conform the story to their particular theology. He even goes so far as to say that the Evangelists told stories that they knew to be untrue.

Ehrman begins his analysis by positing that none of the Evangelists had any personal knowledge of the details of Jesus’ life. He then says that the stories about Jesus were transmitted orally for some 35-65 years before they were written down by the Evangelists. Anyone who has played the parlor game “gossip” knows what happens to twice and thrice told tales.

He offers as an example Mark’s and John’s conflicting dates of the crucifixion. Mark firmly fixes the crucifixion on Passover. John just as firmly dates it to the Day of Preparation, the day before Passover. Ehrman says that John knew the date was Passover but knowingly changed the date to the day before. Why? Because that’s when the Passover lambs were slaughtered and Jesus is the Lamb of God. So according to Ehrman, John told a lie to convey what he believed to be a spiritual truth. I don’t think so. As I discuss why I don’t think so, I will accept Ehrman’s assertion that none of the Evangelists had personal knowledge of Jesus, but I can’t accept his second assertion that they had only oral sources because one of the Evangelists (Luke) tells us he used multiple written sources. 

Ehrman compares Bible scholarship to police investigation, in that they both involve searching for and evaluating clues. I don’t claim to be a Bible scholar, but I do claim to know something about criminal investigations. Ehrman speaks of three evaluative tools that Bible scholars use when attacking the Gospels. He calls them independent attestation, dissimilarity, and contextual credibility.

(1) Independent attestation—If a story is told by multiple independent sources, it is more likely to be true. E.g. John, Mark, Paul, Tacitus, and Josephus are independent sources. They all say Jesus was crucified. Their agreement makes it probable that Jesus was in fact crucified. The same sort of analysis is true of criminal investigations. The more witnesses we have to an event, the greater the likelihood of the event.

(2) Dissimilarity—If the Gospels say something about Jesus that is dissimilar to what later Christians believe, it is more likely to be true. E.g., in Mark’s story of the Syro-Phoenician Jesus referred to non-Jews as dogs. This doesn’t sound like what later Christians thought about Jesus’s attitude toward non-Jews. Jesus probably referred to non-Jews as dogs. In criminal cases we use a similar criterion: when a party comes forward with evidence that is contrary to the party’s position, it is considered more credible.

(3) Contextual credibility—When various persons in the Gospel stories act as we would expect Second Temple Jews to act, these actions have more credibility. If they act like people from a later stage in Christian history, then that action is suspect. Once again, a similar yardstick is employed in evaluating evidence in a court of law.

Here are some additional yardsticks we use in a court of law which might have some application to the question of Gospel interpretation:

(1) You should never call anyone a liar unless you have an ample evidentiary basis for doing so. Forman v. Wallshein, 671 So.2d 872, 875 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

(2) The mere fact that two witnesses disagree does not mean that either of them are lying. Boatwright v. State, 452 So.2d 666 (4th DCA Fla. 1984).

(3) When confronted by conflicts in the testimony of witnesses, you shouldn’t jump to the conclusion that somebody is lying. McLeod v. State, 128 Fla. 35, 174 So. 466 (1937).

The conflict between Mark and John about the date of the Crucifixion is not an ample evidentiary basis for calling either Mark or John a liar.  One of them, of course, has to be wrong, unless different sects of Second Temple Jews celebrated Passover on different days—a resolution of the conflict which has been put forward by some students of the Gospels.

Interestingly, I once had a case in which the credibility of a key witness depended on the date of Easter. He said that his girlfriend couldn’t accompany him on a drug smuggling run because it was over the Easter weekend and she needed to be in church on Easter. Big problem. The weekend of the drug smuggle wasn’t Easter weekend. It looked as though our witness was discredited until further investigation showed that the girlfriend belonged to some minor denomination of the Eastern Orthodox Church which celebrated Easter on a different Sunday than Protestants did. Turned out nobody was lying.

Does this suggest anything about the conflict between John and Mark? Could it be that neither Evangelist was lying but that both were reporting the facts as they sincerely believed them? Maybe Ehrman has it backwards. Maybe John called Jesus the Lamb of God because he sincerely believed Jesus was crucified the day before Passover with the rest of the Passover lambs. Or maybe John only knew that he was crucified around Passover and decided it must have been the day before because Jesus was the Lamb of God. Or maybe he was just mistaken about the date—that doesn’t change the fact that Jesus was crucified.

In my blog on Memories of Murder Weapons I talked about how memory works and how witnesses retell events they’ve seen. I won’t rehash everything I said there, but the bottom line is that we only truly remember the major points of an event and when recalling the event, we “remember” the details by filling in plausible inferences about what happened. For instance, I remember seeing John shoot Mary. When I describe John shooting Mary I say that John pulled the trigger on his firearm. I didn’t see John pull the trigger, but guns won’t fire unless you pull the trigger, therefore I “remember” John pulling the trigger. It’s a subconscious process, and I truly believe that I saw John pull the trigger. Psychologists call this process “confabulation.”

When I wrote The Last Murder, a book about a case I prosecuted, I was remembering events that had happened over three decades in the past. Checking my recollections against newspaper accounts, police reports, and the memories of others involved in the case, I found that I was frequently wrong about the nuances of a transaction but never wrong about the major events of the transaction. When I wrote The Almanac Trial, I wrote it using letters and statements of many of the participants in the trial, but these letters and statements were written three decades or more after the trial. There again, the witnesses were in conflict on the details of the trial, but not the main facts of the trial.

When the Evangelists wrote, they would have had at their disposal both written accounts of the life of Jesus and the reminiscences of eyewitnesses to the life of Jesus. In other words, they’d have been in pretty much the same situation I was in when I wrote The Last Murder and The Almanac Trial. That means that they had accounts which agreed as to the major details but were in conflict as to the minor details. They would therefore have had to make judgments about which minor details were more accurate. E.g. In the story of the healing of the paralytic, his friends tore open the roof of a house that Jesus was in and lowered the paralytic through the hole to get him to Jesus. Mark said they dug a hole in the roof and Luke said they tore up the shingles to the roof. Does it really matter which they did? They made the hole. By the way, Mark was more likely right. First Century Judean houses didn’t have shingled roofs. Be that as it may, I’m not prepared to expel Luke from the New Testament because he was mistaken about the construction of Judean roofs in the time of Jesus.

I’ve worked with the testimony of thousands of witnesses, and I’ve seen all kinds of conflict in testimony. Like Ehrman, I see conflicts in the testimony of the Evangelists. I outlined some of them in The Case against Christ. But in my estimation the conflicts (1) are minor, (2) give no valid reason to doubt the honesty of the Evangelists, and (3) give no valid reason to think that their account of the life of Jesus is untrue.

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THOSE WHO SNIPE AT SNIPERS

Apparently neither Michael Moore nor Bill Maher like Clint Eastwood’s new movie American Sniper (Which I have not seen), and they have expressed their displeasure by sniping at snipers. Despite the injunction of Proverbs 26:4 to “answer not a fool according to his folly, lest you become like unto him,” I feel constrained to reply. When Michael Moore says snipers are cowards he shows that he knows nothing about the nature of courage. When Bill Maher says that snipers are psychopaths, he reveals the depth of his ignorance on the subject of psychopathy. I’ll talk about snipers and cowardice first, and then I’ll say something about snipers and psychopathy.

Snipers have had a bad name at least since the Trojan War when Paris killed Achilles by shooting him with a bow instead of walking up to within arm’s length of the near-invincible killing machine and fighting him hand-to-hand. Paris is remembered as a coward, probably because his side lost the war. King David, for example, got better press for killing the giant Goliath from a distance because his side won and got to write the history. Every army from the dawn of history to the present day has used snipers of one form or another—whether they were slingers, archers, or used some other type of missile weapon—and the American military is no different.

Snipers have been a fixture in the American military since before Declaration of Independence. At the Battle of Bunker Hill snipers hid in the abandoned village of Charlestown and fired on Howe’s troops as they advanced on the patriots’ fortifications. This prompted Howe to order his ships in Boston Harbor to cannonade the town with incendiary bombs. Were the Charlestown snipers cowards? Another sniper stood on the top of the breastworks and fired offhand at the advancing British. He would fire, hand the musket down and be given a primed musket, and then fire again. This constant supply of freshly primed muskets allowed him to keep up a steady stream of fire. By the time he was finally shot and killed, he had shot some twenty British officers. Was he a coward? You cannot call anyone a coward who goes into combat and performs his assigned task to the best of his ability, whether that task is caring for the wounded as a medic or wounding the enemy as a sniper.

Now let’s talk about psychopaths. According to Dr. Hervey Cleckley, a pioneer in the study of psychopathy, a psychopath is unreliable, untruthful, insincere, remorseless, shameless, narcissistic, uncaring about others, and prone to poorly motivated antisocial behavior. Years ago a psychiatrist at the state hospital for the criminally insane gave me the best definition of psychopath that I have ever heard. He told me that a man I wanted to use as a witness was a psychopath. Then he asked me “You know what a psychopath is, don’t you?” I said that I didn’t, and he continued “Bum, hobo, criminal. That’s what a psychopath is.”

During the Battle of Mogadishu two U.S. Army helicopters were shot down and the personnel surrounded by hostile fighters. Something had to be done to protect them. Delta snipers Gary Gordon and Randy Shughart volunteered to hold off the hostile forces until a rescue could be effectuated. They knew that they were volunteering for almost certain death. They nevertheless undertook the mission and fought until they were overrun by a mob consisting of thousands of combatants. Is that something an unreliable, untruthful, insincere, remorseless, law-breaking, shameless narcissist would do? These two men were courageous to a fault and the exact opposite psychopaths. The posthumous Medals of Honor awarded to them were well-deserved.

There’s an old saying that goes “Make sure your brain is in gear before putting your mouth in motion.” Moore and Maher would do well to heed that admonition.

 

PROSECUTING POLICE OFFICERS

Recently the media has publicized a number of cases involving violent encounters between police officers and citizens. The stories follow a uniform pattern: Officer encounters citizen who either is involved in criminal activity or is wrongly believed to be involved in criminal activity. Citizen ends up dead or seriously injured. The officer is “exonerated” by grand jury, prosecutor, or petit jury. The officer is perceived to have “gotten away” with committing a crime. Anger wells up over the perception of [racial][ethnic][religious][sexual orientation] prejudice on the part of police and the criminal justice system.

I know firsthand that such prejudice sometimes plays a part in these episodes, but I will argue that it does not play a pervasive part. I will also argue that when such prejudice plays a part, that part is often very much at odds with the public perception we see reported in the media. In making these arguments, I will also attempt to answer the question “Why do police officers ‘always’ seem to ‘get away’ with killing or injuring citizens?”

As far back as 2,500 years ago philosophers and advocates came to understand that criminal cases were not decided on strictly logical grounds, that character and emotion were near impossible to separate from the decision of such cases. Early writers on trial advocacy took this fact into account when they divided criminal cases into four basic types: honorable, dishonorable, doubtful, and trivial. Having been a prosecutor for 30 years, I will discuss these four types of cases from the vantage point of the prosecution.

In an honorable case, all the intangibles of character and emotion are on your side of the courtroom. Example: An escaped prisoner kidnaps, rapes, and murders a young mother who was on her way to the supermarket to buy formula and diapers for her newborn child.  When you prosecute such a case you are on the side of the angels and you are prosecuting the spawn of Satan. If you’ve got good evidence of guilt, you’ve got a winner.

In a dishonorable case, all the intangibles are against you. Example: A father complains that his child has been sexually assaulted and the police seemingly do nothing. The father confronts the suspect, the suspect insults the father, and the father beats the suspect to death with his bare hands. Don’t be surprised if the father escapes punishment. As you can see, the prosecutor’s honorable case is the defense attorney’s dishonorable case, and vice versa.

Most cases fall into the doubtful category. The intangibles fall more or less evenly on both sides of the courtroom. Example: Two inebriated young men have a difference of opinion over who is going to drive the car home from the barroom. They exchange angry words, and the verbal altercation degenerates into fisticuffs. One of the men ends up dead. The defendant really shouldn’t have killed the victim, but the victim contributed heavily to the situation which resulted in his death. You may be able to obtain a conviction in such cases, but then again you may not.

The fourth category, trivial, describes a case in which it is difficult to find moral turpitude on either side. Example: In Florida, it is a felony to build a public building with exterior doors which only swing in. The reason for this is that in case of a fire, the crowds of people trying to escape the fire will oftentimes push against the exterior door in an attempt to escape. If the doors only swing in, they may get trapped because the panicked people won’t have enough sense to back up so they can get the door open. If you were called as a juror to decide such a case you might think that the prosecutor was wasting your time on such a technicality, unless of course there had been a fire and people had died because of the improperly hung doors. The classic trivial case is DUI without personal injury or property damage. (When I say "trivial," I don't mean the case is really trivial. I mean that it is a case that most people are not going to get excited about).

A lot of what lawyers do in a trial is attempt to get the jury to see their doubtful or trivial case as an honorable case. If defense attorneys have a dishonorable case, they are often satisfied if they can get the jury to perceive it as a trivial case. This last tactic won’t work for prosecutors, because juries rarely convict in cases which they see as trivial.

Now let’s look at the usual pattern for violent confrontations between police officers and citizens and see where they normally fall from the perspective of the defense attorney representing the police officer. (1) The citizen usually comes to the officer’s attention because the citizen is breaking the law. This moves the case to honorable. (2) The citizen often has an extensive criminal record. We move further toward honorable. (3) The officer is simply trying to enforce the law. Further toward honorable. (4) Police officers are perceived by most jurors as “good guys.” Even further toward honorable. (5) Police officers often make very good witnesses. We are now about as far as we can get into the category of honorable.

Now look at the case from a prosecutor’s perspective and tally up the factors which push the case toward dishonorable: (1) The victim was breaking the law. (2) The victim and the victim’s witnesses have criminal records. (3) The officer was merely attempting to enforce the law. (4) Police officers are perceived by most jurors as “good guys.” (5) The witnesses for the prosecution are usually not as “good” as police officer witnesses. The prosecution starts off in a deep hole and will have trouble climbing out of it.

Of course, there are myriads of additional factors which can push the prosecution case toward honorable and the defense case toward dishonorable. Such factors include, but or not limited to the following: The officer may have been extremely discourteous, or may have used excessive force, or may have done something incredibly stupid, or may have displayed blatant disregard for proper police procedure, or may get himself tangled in a web of false statements.  These factors will weigh heavily against the officer in a police brutality lawsuit, but they won’t weigh as much in a criminal prosecution. There are two reasons for this: (1) The lighter burden of proof in a civil case, and (2) the fact that in a civil case you’re only arguing over money, not life and liberty.

Up to now I’ve only talked about the non-legal intangibles of such cases, but when I broached the subject of burden of proof, I have begun to talk about the legal obstacles to convicting police officers. The burden of proof is not the only legal obstacle. Our criminal justice system is designed to insure (as much as humanly possible) that the innocent don’t get wrongly convicted. We do this at the expense of erecting barriers to prosecution which protect the guilty. Remember the old saw: “It’s better that [10][100][1,000] guilty go free than that one innocent be wrongfully convicted.”

I’m not going to discuss all the barriers to conviction which we have erected, but I do want to look at one barrier which I think plays the largest part in such cases—the laws relating to lawful use of deadly force. I’m just going to look at Florida law because that’s what I’m most familiar with, but Florida law is similar to such laws all over the United States. I’m not going to talk about the case law or statute law relating to deadly force, I’m going to talk about what judges tell jurors about the law of deadly force. (At the end of this article, I have set out the Florida Standard Jury Instructions dealing with the use of deadly force).

First, let’s talk about the general law relating to use of deadly force and then we’ll talk about those laws specific to the use of deadly force by law enforcement officers. The most important aspect of the deadly force law is the fact that in a criminal case the defendant doesn’t have to prove that he acted in self-defense. All he has to do is raise a reasonable doubt about whether he acted in self-defense. If the jury has a reasonable doubt, they must acquit. This is very different than in a civil case, where the officer is going to have to prove that he acted in self-defense.

You can use deadly force in self-defense if you reasonably believe that it is necessary to keep you from suffering death or great bodily harm. You don’t have to actually be in danger of death or great bodily harm, you simply have to be confronted by a situation where the appearance of danger causes you to reasonably fear death or great bodily harm. This factor often comes into play when officers shoot suspects who are “armed” with toy guns or other object that look like guns.

You can not only use deadly force to protect yourself from death or great bodily harm, you can use it to prevent the commission of a forcible felony against your person. This means a jury could determine that you acted in lawful self-defense even in situations where you knew full well that you were in no danger of death or great bodily harm.

Example: Dan Doofus is shooting a shotgun at you as you sit in your vehicle. You know full well you are at the maximum effective range of the shotgun and that the pellets are going to do nothing more than ruin your paint job. You have a scoped .308 deer rifle and are a master marksman. You shoot Dan Doofus dead to keep him from ruining your car’s paint job. You can argue that the killing is justifiable homicide based on the following interpretation of the self-defense law. Dan has committed the forcible felony of shooting at an occupied vehicle. (Fla.Stat. § 790.19).  Although it isn’t one of the crimes specifically defined as a forcible felony in Fla.Stat. § 776.08, it is a crime “which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.”

This has particular applicability to law enforcement officers because the crime of resisting an officer with violence is a forcible felony. (Fla.Stat. § 843.01). The crime of resisting an officer with violence can be committed in a completely nonviolent fashion by simply uttering the threat “If you try to arrest me, I’m going to poke you in the nose.” Under a strict reading of the language of the Florida Standard Jury Instructions, the officer is arguably justified in whipping out his gun and shooting the suspect dead to prevent getting a bloody nose.

Another Example: I just read a novel in which a police officer decided to kill someone. In order to kill the man, he engineered a situation which he knew would cause the suspect to violently resist arrest. The suspect was bigger and stronger than the officer, far superior in hand-to-hand combat, and also a sadistic brute. The officer approached the suspect, made sure that the suspect saw him discard his weapon, and told the suspect was under arrest. When the suspect attacked the officer, the officer pulled out a concealed weapon and killed him. Justifiable homicide.

The fact that the officer is making an arrest can be argued to give him even more justification than this. After the arrest resister finishes beating the officer to a bloody pulp, he’s not going to say “Okay, now you can arrest me.” He’s going to walk off, effecting an escape. The officer has told the suspect he’s under arrest, the suspect is now in the officer’s custody. When he leaves the officer’s custody, he has escaped. An officer has a right to use deadly force to prevent the escape. A defense attorney can argue that he was perfectly justified in shooting the suspect in the back as the suspect walked away because he was preventing an escape from custody. “Now ladies and gentlemen of the jury, please listen very carefully to the judge’s instruction when she tells you “A law enforcement officer or other person who has an arrested person in [his] [her] custody is justified in the use of any force that [he] [she] reasonably believes to be necessary to prevent the escape of the arrested person from custody.”

The examples I have given are, of course, extreme examples where the defendant quite likely will not be able to convince a jury to find him not guilty. I am exaggerating in order to demonstrate that in less extreme situations the defendant has a good likelihood of escaping punishment.

I’ve handled enough homicide cases to know that just because a homicide is “justifiable,” that doesn’t mean it is either necessary or unavoidable. So as you see there are myriads of factors working against the prosecution in any doubtful case, and those factors are magnified in cases where the defendant is a police officer. These factors are there regardless of the ethnicity, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation of the parties involved.

Prosecutors have the duty of bringing criminal charges only when they believe that they have a reasonable prospect of conviction. The clearest statement of this principle can be found in the Federal U.S. Attorney’s Resource Manual, §9-27.220A, which provides that Federal prosecutors should “commence or recommend Federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person's conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction….”

So why do so many officers “get away” with killing civilians? Because it’s so hard to get a conviction. Because conscientious prosecutors don’t file charges unless they’re confident they can get a conviction.

Now I’ve handled a lot of resisting arrest cases, both as a prosecutor and defense attorney, and I know that sometimes officers provoke suspects into acting out violently. In my experience, however, those violent confrontations usually come about because the arrestees don’t like police officers. You might even say they are prejudiced against police officers.

 

3.6(f)  JUSTIFIABLE USE OF DEADLY FORCE

 

                Because there are many defenses applicable to self-defense, give only those parts of the instructions that are required by the evidence.

 

                Read in all cases.

                An issue in this case is whether the defendant acted in self-defense.  It is a defense to the offense with which (defendant) is charged if the [death of] [injury to] (victim) resulted from the justifiable use of deadly force.

 

                Definition.

                “Deadly force” means force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.

 

                Give if applicable.  § 782.02, Fla. Stat.

                The use of deadly force is justifiable only if the defendant reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] while resisting:

 

1.            another’s attempt to murder [him] [her], or

 

2.            any attempt to commit (applicable felony) upon [him] [her], or

 

3.            any attempt to commit (applicable felony) upon or in any dwelling, residence, or vehicle occupied by [him] [her].

 

                Insert and define applicable felony that defendant alleges victim attempted to commit.

 

                Give if applicable.  §§ 776.012, 776.031, Fla. Stat.

                A person is justified in using deadly force if [he] [she] reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent

 

1.            imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] or another, or

 

2.            the imminent commission of (applicable forcible felony) against [himself] [herself] or another.

                Insert and define applicable forcible felony that defendant alleges victim was about to commit. Forcible felonies are listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat.

 

                Aggressor.  § 776.041, Fla. Stat.

                However, the use of deadly force is not justifiable if you find:

 

                Give only if the defendant is charged with an independent forcible felony.  See Giles v. State, 831 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

1.            (Defendant) was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of (applicable forcible felony); or

 

                Define applicable forcible felony.  Define after paragraph 2 if both paragraphs 1 and 2 are given. Forcible felonies are listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat.

2.            (Defendant) initially provoked the use of force against [himself] [herself], unless:

 

a.            The force asserted toward the defendant was so great that [he] [she] reasonably believed that [he] [she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and had exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger, other than using deadly force on (assailant).

 

b.            In good faith, the defendant withdrew from physical contact with (assailant) and clearly indicated to (assailant) that [he] [she] wanted to withdraw and stop the use of deadly force, but (assailant) continued or resumed the use of force.

 

                Force in resisting a law enforcement officer  § 776.051(1), Fla. Stat.

                A person is not justified in using force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer, or to resist a law enforcement officer who is engaged in the execution of a legal duty, if the law enforcement officer was acting in good faith and he or she is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer.

 

                Give if applicable.

                However, if an officer uses excessive force to make an arrest, then a person is justified in the use of reasonable force to defend [himself] [herself] (or another), but only to the extent [he] [she] reasonably believes such force is necessary.  See § 776.012, Fla. Stat.; Ivester v. State, 398 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Jackson v. State, 463 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

 

                In some instances, the instructions applicable to §§ 776.012, 776.031, or 776.041, Fla. Stat., may need to be given in connection with this instruction.

 

                Read in all cases.

                In deciding whether defendant was justified in the use of deadly force, you must judge [him] [her] by the circumstances by which [he] [she] was surrounded at the time the force was used.  The danger facing the defendant need not have been actual; however, to justify the use of deadly force, the appearance of danger must have been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same circumstances would have believed that the danger could be avoided only through the use of that force.  Based upon appearances, the defendant must have actually believed that the danger was real.

 

                No duty to retreat. § 776.013(3), Fla. Stat.  See Novak v. State 974 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2008)  regarding unlawful activity.  There is no duty to retreat where the defendant was not engaged in any unlawful activity other than the crime(s) for which the defendant asserts the justification.

If the defendant [was not engaged in an unlawful activity and] was attacked in any place where [he] [she] had a right to be, [he] [she] had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand [his] [her] ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if [he] [she] reasonably believed that it was necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.

 

Define applicable forcible felony from list in § 776.08, Fla. Stat. that defendant alleges victim was about to commit.

 

Presumption of Fear (dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle).  Give if applicable.  § 776.013(2)(a)-(d), Fla. Stat. 

If the defendant was in a(n)[dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] where [he] [she] had a right to be, [he] [she] is presumed to have had a reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself] [herself] [another] if (victim) had [unlawfully and forcibly entered] [removed or attempted to remove another person against that person’s will from] that [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] and the defendant had reason to believe that had occurred.  The defendant had no duty to retreat under such circumstances.

 

                Exceptions to Presumption of Fear. § 776.013(2)(a)-(d), Fla. Stat.  Give as applicable.  

                The presumption of reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm does not apply if:

 

a.            the person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to be in [or is a lawful resident of the [dwelling] [residence]] [the vehicle], such as an owner,

                lessee, or titleholder, and there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person; or

 

b.            the person or persons sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person against whom the defensive force is used; or

 

c.             the person who uses defensive force is engaged in an unlawful activity or is using the [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] to further an unlawful activity; or

 

                d.            the person against whom the defensive force is used is a law enforcement officer, who enters or attempts to enter a [dwelling] [residence] [vehicle] in the performance of [his] [her] official duties and the officer identified [himself] [herself] in accordance with any applicable law or the person using the force knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or attempting to enter was a law enforcement officer.

        If requested, give definition of “law enforcement officer” from § 943.10(14), Fla. Stat.,    

 

§ 776.013(4), Fla. Stat.  

A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter another’s [dwelling] [residence] [occupied vehicle] is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence.

                Definitions.  Give if applicable. § 776.013(5), Fla. Stat.  

As used with regard to self defense:

 

                “Dwelling” means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent or mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night.

 

                “Residence” means a dwelling in which a person resides either temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest.

 

                “Vehicle” means a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, which is designed to transport people or property.

 

                Prior threats.  Give if applicable.

                If you find that the defendant who because of threats or prior difficulties with (victim) had reasonable grounds to believe that [he] [she] was in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of (victim), then the defendant had the right to arm [himself] [herself].  However, the defendant cannot justify the use of deadly force, if after arming [himself] [herself] [he] [she] renewed [his] [her] difficulty with (victim) when [he] [she] could have avoided the difficulty, although as previously explained if the defendant was not engaged in an unlawful activity and was attacked in any place where [he] [she] had a right to be, [he] [she] had no duty to retreat.

 

                Reputation of victim.  Give if applicable.

                If you find that (victim) had a reputation of being a violent and dangerous person and that [his] [her] reputation was known to the defendant, you may consider this fact in determining whether the actions of the defendant were those of a reasonable person in dealing with an individual of that reputation.

 

                Physical abilities.  Read in all cases.

                In considering the issue of self-defense, you may take into account the relative physical abilities and capacities of the defendant and (victim).

                Read in all cases.

                If in your consideration of the issue of self-defense you have a reasonable doubt on the question of whether the defendant was justified in the use of deadly force, you should find the defendant not guilty.

 

                However, if from the evidence you are convinced that the defendant was not justified in the use of deadly force, you should find [him] [her] guilty if all the elements of the charge have been proved.

 

Comment

 

                This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1985 [477 So. 2d 985], 1999 [732 So. 2d 1044], 2000 [789 So. 2d 984], 2006 [930 So. 2d 612], and 2010.

 

3.6(h) JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE

BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER

 

                In making an arrest of a felon. § 776.05, Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

                A law enforcement officer, or any person [he] [she] has summoned or directed to assist [him] [her], need not retreat from or stop efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. The officer is justified in the use of any force that [he] [she] reasonably believes necessary to defend [himself] [herself] or another from bodily harm while making the arrest. That force is also justifiable when necessarily used:

 

1.                   in retaking a felon who has escaped or

 

2.                   in arresting a felon who is fleeing from justice.

 

                Force in making unlawful arrest or unlawful execution of a legal duty prohibited . § 776.051(2), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

                Use of any force by a law enforcement officer or any person summoned or directed to assist the law enforcement officer is not justified if:

               

1.                   the [arrest] [execution of a legal duty] is unlawful and

 

2.                   it is known by the officer or the person assisting [him] [her] to be unlawful.

 

                To prevent escape from custody. § 776.07(1), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

                A law enforcement officer or other person who has an arrested person in [his] [her] custody is justified in the use of any force that [he] [she] reasonably believes to be necessary to prevent the escape of the arrested person from custody.

 

                To prevent escape from penal institution. § 776.07(2), Fla. Stat. Give if applicable.

                A guard or other law enforcement officer is justified in the use of any force that [he] [she] reasonably believes to be necessary to prevent an escape from a penal institution of a person the officer reasonably believes is lawfully detained.

 

                Give if applicable.

                "Deadly force" includes, but is not limited to

 

1.                   firing a firearm in the direction of the person to be arrested, even though no intent exists to kill or inflict great bodily harm; and § 776.06(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

 

2.                   firing a firearm at a vehicle in which the person to be arrested is riding. § 776.06(1)(b), Fla. Stat.

 

                Definition. Give if applicable.

                A "firearm" is legally defined as (adapt from § 790.001(6), Fla. Stat., as required by allegations).

 

Comment

 

                This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1989, 2004, and 2010.