There’s a lot of noise in the media now about our president
going to Japan and apologizing for Hiroshima. There happens to be nothing to
apologize for. We did not start the war, and it quickly became a
no-holds-barred fight to the finish, with the Japanese strategy being to
inflict so many casualties upon us that we would give up the fight rather than
continue it. Each storm landing in our island-hopping campaign was bloodier
that the previous one, and the biggest bloodbaths came at Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
The cost in American lives and the maimed bodies of American fighting men,
however, was nothing compared to the butcher’s bill that was expected from the
invasion of Japan.
They planned a two stage operation. First we would invade
Kyushu, seize its ports and airfields, and from there stage an invasion of
Honshu, the main island. The terrain of Kyushu was every bit as formidable as
that of Okinawa and Iwo Jima. It would not be a war of maneuver as in Europe,
but a toe-to-toe slugfest with a dug-in and highly motivated defense force. Planners
anticipated 60,000 casualties in the invasion of Kyushu, but this was before
they found out about the Japanese plans. We had cracked the Japanese codes and
were reading their mail by the end of the war, and knew exactly what they were
up to. That knowledge was not reassuring. The Japanese high command had
wargamed the US invasion, and they had predicted what we planned to do so
precisely that our side thought they had spies among our planners.
The Japanese were as
ready for us as one war-weary country can be ready for another war-weary
country. The number of troops defending Kyushu was equal to the number of
troops assigned to take the island. Military theory posits that in order to
insure success in an attack, the attacker should outnumber the defender by 3 to
1. They had trained up a new fleet of Kamikaze aircraft and pilots, and they
were training these pilots to ignore the warships and attack only troop
transports. They had a fleet of suicide boats and mini-submarines ready to
attack the landing craft as they went ashore. They had special troops trained
for suicide attacks on the forces which arrived ashore. We would have
eventually taken our objectives on Kyushu, but the cost in human life, both
Japanese and American, would be staggering. Then we would have to turn around
and do it all over again on Honshu.
My father was in the Third Marine Division, having seen
combat at Guam, Bougainville, and Iwo Jima. The Third Marine Division was
slated to spearhead the assault on the island along with the Second Marine
Division. My father, like a lot of other young men who had spent the last three
years of their lives fighting in the Pacific, had decided that he was not going
to survive the invasion. Many of the men training for the invasion of Honshu
believed that the death told would be so high at Kyushu that they would be
called into combat at Kyushu.
The worst thing about fighting a war is that people die. When
waging war, you really want to try your best to make sure that fewest number of
your people die as possible. When confronted with the unpleasant choice of many
of their people dying versus many of our people dying, then we must choose many
of their people dying. But that wasn’t the choice Truman faced. He faced the
choice of many of their people dying versus many more of our people dying AND
many more of their people dying.
Before considering making an apology for Hiroshima, read
Chapter 9 of Joseph H. Alexander’s book Storm
Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific, or some similar
source describing the anticipated invasion of Japan. If Truman had not ordered
the use of the atomic bomb, we would have invaded Japan, and there would probably
have been a postwar Baby Bubble rather than a Baby Boom. I’m pretty sure I
wouldn’t be here, and I suspect many of those who want to line up and apologize
for Hiroshima wouldn’t be here either.
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